Canada's Repeated Trade Failures with China: A 50-Year Pattern of Disappointment

Canada has developed a troubling pattern of turning to China whenever facing trade difficulties with the United States, and according to expert analysis, this approach has consistently failed to deliver positive results. Despite multiple historical lessons, Ottawa continues to pursue this strategy, often overlooking significant security concerns in the process.

A Historical Pattern of Failed Outreach

Dennis Molinaro, author of Under Assault: Interference and Espionage in China's Secret War Against Canada, identifies a recurring cycle that spans decades. "Instead of diversifying trade with like-minded democracies, Canada went begging at the doorstep of the Communist state that had been engaged in foreign interference and espionage against Canada and the U.S. for the past 30 years," Molinaro writes about the 2008 approach.

This pattern extends back through multiple administrations and economic circumstances:

The late 1970s and early 1980s saw initial outreach attempts
The mid-1990s witnessed renewed efforts at engagement
The 2008 financial crisis prompted another round of China-focused trade diversification
Current 2026 policies continue this established pattern

Each instance followed similar triggers: disagreements with the United States, economic slowdowns south of the border, or a desire for Canada to chart its own economic path. The consistent outcome has been disappointment and renewed recognition of security risks.

The Canola Conundrum: A Case Study in Failed Diversification

Canada's agricultural sector provides the clearest example of how trade diversification with China has repeatedly backfired. For nearly three decades, Canadian canola has been specifically targeted by Chinese trade restrictions and tariffs:

In 2009, just one year after Canada's 2008 outreach, China began restricting Canadian canola imports, citing pest contamination concerns that many analysts viewed as political retaliation for human rights discussions
In 2016, China threatened to tighten restrictions on canola by lowering allowable dockage rates
In 2019, Beijing blocked large shipments of canola and restricted imports of Canadian pork and beef following the arrest of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou
Most recently, China imposed a 100 percent tariff on Canadian canola after Ottawa introduced tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles

"What should be glaringly apparent is that for nearly 30 years, China has repeatedly targeted Canadian canola," Molinaro emphasizes. "Diversification was required in that sector, away from dependence on the PRC."

Electric Vehicles: Repeating Past Mistakes with New Technology

As Canada now reduces tariffs and allows Chinese electric vehicles into the country, security concerns are again being set aside for perceived trade benefits. These vehicles have already raised significant security questions in other democratic nations:

In Israel, the Israel Defense Forces reportedly recalled hundreds of Chinese-manufactured vehicles from officers and restricted their access to certain government buildings
In the United Kingdom, electric vehicles containing Chinese components face restrictions at government and military sites over espionage concerns, even when assembled elsewhere
In the United States, the Pentagon considered adding BYD to its list of companies believed to aid China's military, with the Department of Defense briefly adding the automaker before withdrawing the entire list

"Now, as Canada agrees to reduce tariffs and allow PRC electric vehicles into the country, it is again setting aside security concerns, this time in the very products being imported," Molinaro notes.

A Fundamental Misunderstanding of China's Trade Approach

The core issue, according to Molinaro's analysis, is Canada's persistent misunderstanding of China's approach to international trade. "After every venture over the past 50 years that set aside or minimized the security risks posed by the PRC, Canada finds itself puzzled when Beijing reminds us that China is not simply another option for trade diversification," he observes.

China consistently uses trade as a political tool, responding to diplomatic disagreements with economic pressure. This pattern has become predictable over decades, yet Canadian policymakers continue to approach China as though it were a conventional trading partner rather than a strategic competitor with different priorities and methods.

The question remains whether Canada will finally learn from this 50-year pattern of disappointment or continue repeating the same mistakes while expecting different results. As trade diversification discussions continue in 2026, historical evidence suggests that turning to China as a solution to trade woes has consistently proven to be what Molinaro describes as "a losing play."